This is getting weird

We’re starting to quote Camille Paglia approvingly altogether too often in these parts. But golly, she has another neat piece. Which includes this little gem:

I like Sarah Palin, and I’ve heartily enjoyed her arrival on the national stage. As a career classroom teacher, I can see how smart she is — and quite frankly, I think the people who don’t see it are the stupid ones, wrapped in the fuzzy mummy-gauze of their own worn-out partisan dogma. So she doesn’t speak the King’s English — big whoop! There is a powerful clarity of consciousness in her eyes. She uses language with the jumps, breaks and rippling momentum of a be-bop saxophonist. I stand on what I said (as a staunch pro-choice advocate) in my last two columns — that Palin as a pro-life wife, mother and ambitious professional represents the next big shift in feminism. Pro-life women will save feminism by expanding it, particularly into the more traditional Third World.

[h/t Five Feet of Fury]

[cross-posted to PWPL]

Is the nation-state a blip?

Friend and fellow PWPL blogger Rebecca Walberg reviews a book on terrorism, here. An excerpt:

The rise of private security companies, a.k.a. – mercenaries, has been given a relatively high profile by the presence of Blackwater and similar groups in Iraq, where (at the time Brave New War was written) 100,000 civilians operated in support of 130,000 US armed forces personnel. Contractors now provide not only routine services for the military such as laundry, cooking and maintenance of vehicles, but most controversially, security and bodyguard services. Robb views this reliance on mercenaries as a sign of the general weakening of the state, which has historically been defined by its monopoly on force. Signs of this shift predate Iraq, though, as he makes clear in an assessment of the increasing numbers of American communities and individuals that rely upon private security to defend their property and physical safety.

On the fringes of private police forces and military contractors are paramilitary groups that operate roughly in parallel with the state, but without its official sanction. One example is Colombia’s United Self-Defense Force (AUC), an armed group operating against FARC, which serves the government’s greater interests and which turns a blind eye towards its sporadic forays into the drug trade. Less sinister but closer to home are the American Minutemen in the southwest, whom Robb describes as a paramilitary force working in concert with the Border Patrol.

All these trends – the entrepreneurial nature of guerilla violence, the reliance upon private companies for security and defense needs, and the continued operation of paramilitaries – are, Robb believes, part of a greater and profound shift that is now taking place, after which we will live in a post-national world. Like highly trained soldiers the world over, Robb has studied military history and the great strategists, and sees current events as part of a pattern dating back to the 17th century and the Thirty Years’ War.
Fought in central and western Europe, the war was triggered by religious conflict, and drew in fiefdoms, principalities, and small kingdoms from across the continent. Bloodshed and general barbarity reached then unprecedented levels, and the costs, both human and economic, of this long and intense war effectively put small states out of business. When the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648, only large kingdoms had the resources to fight modern wars, and it is to this date that the birth of the modern state system is often traced. From that date until the 20th century, wars served to enhance the strength of the state and the level of control sought by the government over all spheres.

It is this process, begun in the mid 17th century and continuing for more than three centuries, that Robb sees unraveling in Iraq and around the world. Now, the massive infrastructure of military power is a weakness, reacting slowly and inefficiently to guerilla attacks; and the sophisticated and regulated economies of Western states are an Achilles heel, since a small breakdown, whether an explosion at an oil pipeline or a failure in a power grid, can cascade throughout an entire system. Strong central government is a liability, moving lethargically through bureaucratic channels to counter threats that are mercurial. When wars are best fought by non-state actors, Robb suggests, the nation-state is no longer relevant. [emphasis mine]

Well. Reading Rebecca’s piece I found myself thinking: Is it possible that the nation-state was only a shortish historical blip? Is it possible that its fundamental organization is unsuited to the proper and orderly maintenance of a society? That societies that are not inherently dysfunctional do not necessarily benefit from a gigantic state apparatus?

I don’t know, but I find those questions fascinating. I’m pretty sure I’m not the first one to ponder them – if you have decent reading material on the subject, please send it my way.